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 Abstract 
 
To identify communication externalities in French cities, we exploit a unique survey recording workplace 
communication of individual workers.  Our hypothesis is that in larger and/or more educated cities, workers 
should communicate more.  In turn, more communication should have a positive effect on individual wages.  By 
estimating both an earnings and a communication equation, we find evidence of communication externalities.  
Being in a larger and more educated city makes workers communicate more and in turn this has a positive 
effects on wages.  However, only a small fraction of the overall effects of a more educated and larger city on 
wages percolates through this channel.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The strength of human capital externalities is a key determinant of the optimal subsidy to 
education. Furthermore, as argued by Lucas (1988) and his followers, human capital 
externalities could constitute a crucial engine of growth and development. Local human 
capital externalities are also accepted as one of the main reasons to justify the existence of 
cities since Marshall (1890). Hence, obtaining reliable estimates for the strength of human 
capital externalities is widely acknowledged to be of fundamental importance. 
 It is also essential to know how these externalities percolate. There are three main 
reasons for this. First, the literature typically infers the existence of human capital 
externalities indirectly by estimating a wedge between private and social returns to 
education. 1 It speaks of human capital externality when an aggregate measure of human 
capital has a positive effect on individual earnings over and above that of individual 
characteristics. Such findings however might be driven by some missing variables and not by 
human capital externalities. Second, getting the optimal subsidy to education right is one 
thing but there could be other corrective policies. As suggested by Marshall (1890), human 
capital externalities may take place mostly between workers in the same city and industry 
through face-to-face interactions. Then fostering regular meetings within local professional 
associations may be a good way to improve economic efficiency. Third, without knowing 
how these externalities percolate, nothing prevents the theorists from assuming whatever they 
like. Theoretical progress is thus hampered by our lack of knowledge about the precise nature 
of human capital effects.2 In short, knowing how human capital externalities percolate is of 
considerable importance for both theory and policy. 
 When elaborating on ‘human capital externalities’, the literature almost inevitably 
alludes to some form of technological externalities and mentions face-to-face meetings, 
word-of-mouth communication, direct interactions between skilled workers, and the like. 
This quasi-exclusive focus on a particular sub-set of human capital externalities, which we 
call communication externalities, may not be warranted. Human capital could have some 
external effects through a variety of other channels. More human capital in a city could foster 
                                                                 
1 See for instance Rauch (1993), Acemoglu and Angrist (2000), Adserà (2000), Moretti (2000), or Simon and 
Nardinelli (2002). This literature is discussed more in-depth below.  
2 There is a long tradition in urban economics that justifies the existence of cities by an appeal to technological 
externalities involving direct interactions between agents (see Duranton and Puga, 2003, for a review). 
However, this literature offers only weak micro -economic foundations for these externalities. This difficult 
theoretical undertaking is made all the more difficult by the absence of evidence about how these externalities 
percolate, whom they concern, and at which spatial scale they take place. 
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the supply of specialised intermediate goods and in turn improve the productivity of final 
producers – a pecuniary externality unrelated to communication externalities. More human 
capital could also lead to better matches between employers and employees. One could also 
invoke a more extensive division of labour within a more educated workforce, etc. 
 In this paper, we propose a novel attempt to identify communication externalities and 
distinguish them from the other external effects of human capital. To do this, we exploit a 
unique survey recording workplace communication practices for around 6,000 French 
workers in 1997. Because of its careful design and implementation, we believe this survey 
contains very valuable information about workplace communication. 3 Our identifying 
assumption is that larger and/or more educated cities should favour communication as 
postulated for instance by Beckmann (1976), Borukhov and Hochman (1977), Fujita and 
Ogawa (1982), Black and Henderson (1999), Glaeser (1999), Berliant, Reed and Wang 
(2001) or Lucas (2001) among others. Then it should also be the case that more 
communication should have a positive impact on individual earnings (Jovanovic and Rob, 
1989, and the references above). The strength of communication externalities can then be 
computed as the effects of city size and average urban schooling on communication times 
that of communication on earnings. 
 Consistent with our two hypotheses, we find that workplace communication is 
positively associated with earnings and that city size and average urban schooling are 
positively associated with workplace communication. However, in total only about a tenth of 
the effects of city size and average urban schooling appear to percolate through 
communication externalities. This suggests that the bulk of the effects of city size and 
average urban schooling on earnings, which are sizeable and highly significant, must 
percolate through channels other than communication externalities. 
 With respect to the strength of communication externalities, these findings may be 
biased downwards because we can only observe the amount of communication and not its 
quality. If larger and more educated cities allow for better rather than more communication, 
we may underestimate the strength of communication externalities. However, these 
unobservable quality effects would need to be very large to justify communication 
                                                                 
3 ‘Communication externalities’ is one of those topics like social capital for which finding ‘market data’ that 
leave reliable paper trails appears hopeless. For the time being, progress on this type of topics may have to rely 
on survey data and experiments.  
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externalities being quantitatively of primary rather than secondary importance.4 On the other 
hand, our findings about communication externalities may be biased upwards because of 
workers’ unobserved heterogeneity. If high-wage cities attract good communicators, we may 
overestimate the strength of communication externalities. To investigate this issue, we use 
information about the worker’s birthplace to distinguish between ‘movers’ and ‘stayers’ in 
separate regressions. We also instrument the characteristics of current worker location by 
location and family characteristics at birth. Overall, we find some evidence of spatial sorting 
but they do not alter the general flavour of our results.  
 As a further concern, workplace communication could be suspected of being 
determined simultaneously with earnings. For instance, when a worker is promoted to a 
higher position, this is likely to involve both a higher wage and more workplace 
communication. To investigate this, one would like to have variables that determine 
workplace communication but remain un-correlated with the residual in our earnings 
equation. Fortunately our survey data contains a wealth of information about the workplace 
and the working conditions of the surveyed workers. Some of the variables related to these 
issues provide good instruments for workplace communication. Using these instruments 
leaves our results mostly unchanged.  
 Three important limitations must be acknowledged. First, our data regards 
communication at the workplace only. We thus ignore potentially important effects of 
communication happening in social networks. These may help workers find jobs, learn about 
business opportunities, etc. Second, we only measure static communication externalities and 
not the kind of long-run learning benefits provided by the cities that are highlighted by 
Glaeser and Maré (2001). Third, we measure communication externalities only at the city 
level and not at the country level. 5 It is however natural to expect communication 
externalities to be strongly localised. Bearing these caveats in mind, our general conclusion is 
that communication externalities are present in cities. However only a small fraction of the 
external effects of human capital percolate through communication. 
                                                                 
4 Besides, it is not fully clear how large cities could offer massively better commu nication without workers 
communicating much more to benefit from these quality advantages. In other words, large quality effects should 
be captured by larger equilibrium volumes of communication. 
5  See Cohen and Soto (2001) for a recent cross-country attempt to measure social returns to education and a 
discussion of the macro literature. In this literature, the pendulum is fast moving between two extremes that 
view the role of human capital as either fundamental or negligible. Cohen and Soto (2001) argue that much of 
the disagreement finds its source in bad data. In their work, they use better data and claim that social and private 
returns to education are essentially equal. However, in their regression, they use the rate of urbanisation as 
control to proxy  for total factor productivity. This variable may however also capture human capital externalities 
taking place in cities.   
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 The strategy of the rest of the paper is the following. The next section reviews some 
relevant empirical literature. Section 3 presents a theoretical model to illustrate the 
identification issues discussed above. Section 4 provides some estimation results for our 
model. Section 5 performs a series of robustness test. Section 6 draws some conclusions. 
 
 
2.  Related Empirical Literature 
 
Our paper is related to three main strands of literature. First, using Roback (1982)’s 
equilibrium location approach, Rauch (1993) estimates hedonic earnings equations by 
regressing individual earnings on a set of individual controls together with city level 
variables. Despite numerous controls for individual and city characteristics, he finds a strong 
effect of average schooling on individual earnings within US cities. This finding has been 
replicated many times (e.g., Adserà, 2000, Simon and Nardinelli, 2002, etc). According to 
this type of estimation, external returns to education in cities could be very large, between 50 
and 100% of the private returns. 
 Rauch’s seminal approach has been criticised on several grounds. Cross-section 
estimations make it difficult to distinguish human capital externalities from the effects of 
unobserved city heterogeneity whereby ‘high-wage’ cities might attract high-education 
workers. A second concern regards individual unobserved heterogeneity. If workers with 
good unobserved characteristics tend to locate in high-education cities, the estimates for 
external returns to human capital obtained in a Rauch-style regression are again biased 
upwards.6 
 To deal with these issues, instrumental variables have been considered. A good 
instrument for average schooling would affect the schooling of the majority of workers in a 
given location without being correlated with local wages. Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) 
argue that differences in school compulsory attendance laws and child labour laws in US 
states over the 20th century provide such variation, at least for secondary education. In their 
preferred estimation, they obtain very small external returns to education. In the same spirit 
but using different instruments for schooling, Moretti (2000) shows that the share of college 
graduates in a city has a strong effect on individual earnings. These results are confirmed 
when using the longitudinal dimension of a panel of workers. 
                                                                 
6 In the same vein, it could be the case that cities with higher wages provide more schooling. 
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 A more fundamental critique to Rauch’s approach has been recently put forward by 
Ciccone and Peri (2002). It builds on a well-known fact: workers are imperfect substitutes in 
production (see Topel, 1997, for a recent overview) so that unskilled wages are typically 
expected to be higher in cities where the relative supply of skilled workers is larger. In other 
words, without accounting for imperfect substitutability between different types of workers, 
human capital externalities may be mistaken for complementarities in production. Ciccone 
and Peri (2002) develop a novel approach to assess the effects of an increase in human capital 
in a city keeping the skill composition of the workforce constant. Applying this ‘constant 
composition’ methodology to US cities, they find small and insignificant human capital 
externalities.  
 We differ from this literature (see Moretti, 2003, for a survey) in our use of workplace 
communication data to directly identify communication externalities, a sub-set of human 
capital externalities. Unlike the aforementioned papers, our primary interest is not to provide 
a better measure of total external returns to education. The novelty in this paper is that we 
focus on workplace communication. That is, we concentrate on one particular channel for 
human capital externalities that figures prominently in our thinking about cities. In this 
regard, our approach is related to the small literature attempting to identify the sources of 
urban increasing returns.  
 Only a few papers attempt to disentangle empirically between different micro-
foundations of urban increasing returns.7 Exemplary in this literature, Holmes (2002) uses the 
differences in the location patterns of sales offices of small vs. large firms. This allows him to 
separate the effects of local market size from those of cost-reducing externalities and 
comparative advantage. Building on Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993), Almeida and 
Kogut (1999) show that the citation trail for patents coincides with the movement of key 
scientific personnel. This suggests that ‘spillovers’ may be channelled through the labour 
market rather than word-of-mouth communication between scientists. In a different vein, 
Dumais, Ellison and Glaeser (1997) use carefully constructed proxies to distinguish between 
the three Marshallian motives for agglomeration. They also find support for thick local labour 
market effects. 
 Finally, although the terminology may differ, communication externalities enjoy 
widespread popularity and attention among other social scientists. Saxenian (1994) is a good 
example of this type of work. She forcefully argues that the root of Silicon Valley’s success 
                                                                 
7 See Rosenthal and Strange (2003) for a more complete survey of this literature. For a more general discussion 
of identification problems raised by non-market interactions, see Manksi (1993) and Brock and Durlauf (2001).  
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are to be found in a unique culture that favours frequent and open face-to-face contacts, 
which in turn lead ideas to flow freely across workers and firms. This literature is discussed 
at length in Storper (1997) who reviews a large body of work offering suggestive evidence 
about communication externalities. Unfortunately this literature relies mostly on qualitative 
evidence and the importance of communication externalities is never quantitatively assessed.8 
 
 
3.  Communication Externalities Vs. Other Human Capital Effects in Cities 
 
The first objective of the model that follows is to show that not all human capital 
externalities can be interpreted as communication externalities. Instead more human capital 
in a city can a priori generate both stronger communication externalities and stronger other 
human capital externalities unrelated to communication, which we model here through an 
input sharing mechanism. 9 This model also shows how communication externalities can be 
empirically distinguished from these other human capital externalities by deriving some 
equations that can be estimated. 
 
3.1. Urban scale effects unrelated to communication externalities 
 
The first part of our model follows Ethier’s (1982) production-side version of Dixit and 
Stiglitz’s (1977) model of monopolistic competition. This model was first embedded in an 
urban framework by Abdel-Rahman (1988), Fujita (1988) and Rivera-Batiz (1988). 
 Final good producers use intermediate goods produced by differentiated suppliers to 
produce a homogenous consumption good under constant returns to scale. This final good, 
which also serves as numéraire, can be traded across cities at no cost. By contrast, 
intermediates cannot be traded across cities so that final good producers can only buy from 
intermediate producers located in the same city. Final producer k in city i produces according 
                                                                 
8 Of particular interest in this body of work, Goddard (1973) and Goddard and Morris (1976) compile very 
detailed communication data about a large group of workers in London. They show a strong link between the 
intensity of communication and central locations. They also document a wealth of interesting features about 
workplace communication. Unfortunately they do not explore the links between communication and productive 
efficiency. 
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where ( )zqk  is the quantity of intermediate z bought by k, ( )1>s  is the elasticity of 
substitution across intermediates, and the notation iz Î  denotes any (intermediate producer) 
z located in city i. After denoting by ( )zp  the price of intermediate z, final producer k’s profit 
is given by: 
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As in Ethier (1982), intermediate goods are produced by monopolistically competitive firms. 
To produce any variety of intermediates, there is a fixed labour overhead to start production 
and a constant quantity of labour is needed for each marginal unit. Employment in firm z, 
expressed in effective units of labour, is thus: 
 
( ) ( ) a+b= zqzl .          (3) 
 
After denoting by iw  the wage rate in city i, the profit function of intermediate producer z in 
city i is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]a+b-=p zqwzqzpz i .        (4) 
 
To solve the model, note first that profit maximisation by final producer k (equation 2) 
implies: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
9 We build on a specific model wherein input sharing between final producers implies increasing returns at the 
city level. Similar results can be obtained with any alternative source of local increasing returns that does not 
rely on communication externalities. See Duranton and Puga (2003) for a survey of the different microeconomic 
foundations of urban increasing returns. Our preference for input-sharing as opposed to, say, matching is that the 
former mechanism naturally benefits all workers symmetrically whereas it is more difficult to conceive how a 
larger fraction of skilled workers in a city could help the matching of unskilled workers to jobs. 
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Since, intermediates cannot be traded across cities, summing over all final producers in the 
city yields the inverse-demand faced by intermediate producer z. This can be inserted into the 
profit of z given by (4). Profit maximization by intermediate producers then implies that the 
price of intermediates, ( ) ( )1-ssb= iwzp , is a mark-up over marginal cost and is 
independent of total market size. Then under free entry in the production of intermediates, the 
output of any intermediate producer is independent of market size: ( ) ( ) b-sa= 1zq . After 
denoting by iL  total effective labour supply in city i, total output is then given by: 
 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )11
111
1 -ss-ss
-ss-s Fºbsa
-s
= iii LLY .      (6) 
 
 Finally clearing on the labour market and free entry for final producers imply that final 
output is fully dissipated in the wage bill. This yields the following wage rate: 
 
( )11 -sF= ii Lw .          (7) 
 
This wage increases with city size. A larger workforce in a city leads to a wider range of 
intermediates being produced for final good production. Since these intermediates enter the 
production function of final good producers with the same constant elasticity of substitution 
s , a wider range of intermediates results in final output rising more than proportionately. 
Hence, despite constant returns to scale at the firm level in final production, there are 
aggregate increasing returns working through this pecuniary externality. The strength of these 
aggregate increasing returns decreases with s , the elasticity of substitution between 
intermediates. To summarise, in this model, which is arguably the canonical model of 
agglomeration economies, local increasing returns arise from sharing a greater variety of 
intermediates by final producers as the local market expands. 
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3.2. Human capital in cities  
 
The effective labour supply of worker j, denoted jl , is a function of her human capital, jh . 
Then, aggregate effective labour supply in city i, iL  is the sum of the effective labour supply 
of all workers living in the city. Specifically:  
 
å
Î
=
ij
ji lL , where 
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j el = .        (8) 
 
In turn, the human capital of worker j living in city i, jh , is a function of her measured skills 
such as those accruing from education and labour market experience, js , her volume of 
communication, jx , and some unobserved productivity shock, je :  
 
jjjj xsh e+g+d= .          (9) 
 
The idiosyncratic shocks, e , are assumed to be normal and iid. The basic justification for the 
specification in (9) is that a worker’s productivity depends not only on her observed skills 
(education, experience, etc) but also on the informal knowledge and information she receives 
when communicating and some unobserved random component (such as a temporary 
productivity shock or some unobserved abilities).10  
 
The labour market earnings of worker j living in city i, jW  are equal to jilw . After inserting 
(8) and (9) into (7), we obtain: 
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10 Observation and imitation may also provide a channel for increasing human capital. For most skilled 
occupations, we expect this channel in its pure form to be of trivial importance. Instead we expect observation 
and imitation to be combined with communication. Note also that skills and communication are perfect 
substitutes in the production of human capital but they complement each other when it comes to effective labour 
supply. Using (8) and (9), it is easy to verify that: 02 >¶¶¶ jjj xsl . 
10 
When sd  and xg  are small, a Taylor expansion implies 
 
( ) jjjiiiij xsxsNW e+g+d+e+g+d+-s+F» log1
1
loglog ,    (11) 
 
where iN  is the population in city i. By the law of large numbers 0=ei  so that ii xs g+d  is 
the average human capital in city i. According to (11), individual earnings increase with the 
individual effective labour supply. In turn, the latter is determined by individual 
characteristics (i.e., skills, js , communication, jx , and the unobserved random component, 
je ). At the same time, earnings are also influenced by city aggregates. Because of input 
sharing, earnings are higher in cities where aggregate effective labour supply is higher, that is 
where workers are more numerous, more skilled, and communicate more (i.e., higher iN , is , 
and ix  respectively).11  
 
3.3. Communication externalities in cities  
 
The theoretical literature on externalities in cities proposes a variety of mechanisms to 
explain why cities may foster communication externalities. Glaeser (1999) and Berliant, Reed 
and Wang (2001) explicitly assume that larger cities offer more opportunities for face-to-face 
meetings --- a population size effect. Jovanovic and Rob (1989) and many others suggest that 
during face-to-face interactions, skilled workers learn more from other skilled workers than 
from unskilled workers. Hence holding the number of meetings fixed, a more skilled 
workforce provides better learning opportunities --- an average human capital effect. 
Combining the two effects, larger and more educated cities are widely assumed to increase 
workplace communication and in turn to raise wages.  
 However, we cannot expect workplace communication to be influenced only by city 
level variables. First, some workers may be better at communicating because of their better 
measurable skills (viz. reading, writing, etc). Furthermore, social skills may foster one’s 
                                                                 
11 Previewing some estimation issues, note that we assume that cities differ only in their average human capital 
and their population size. The effects of exogenous productivity differences between cities (i.e., differences in 
F ) and spatial sorting of workers with respect to their unobserved characteristics (i.e., 0¹e i ) are discussed in 
Section 5. We also bear in mind that in small cities, the number of observations may be small so that the 
approximation 0=e i  given by the law of large numbers may be invalid. This may then generate some 
heteroscedasticity in our results.   
11 
abilities to extract information during face-to-face communication, to put forward ideas in 
small-group meetings or to generate loyalty from colleagues, subordinates, employers, etc. 
The simplest specification is to assume that personal workplace communication of worker j 
in city i is given by:  
 
jjiij s.Ds.CN.BAx m++++= log .       (12) 
 
where A is a constant, B is a coefficient measuring the elasticity of individual workplace 
communication with respect to city size, C measures the effect of average skills in city i, and 
D is the effect of individual (measured) skills. The m  capture individual unobserved social 
skills, which are assumed to be iid and normally distributed.12 Workers with better skills 
(measured, js , or social and unobserved, jm ) are expected to communicate more. Workers 
located in larger and/or more educated cities are also expected to communicate more because 
of more people to meet and higher quality meetings.13 In this sense, we speak of 
communication externalities. 
 
Inserting (12) into (11), we obtain, 
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This reduced form is such that the earnings of worker j increase when she has better 
measured skills, js , when she has better social skills jm  and better unobserved productive 
skills, je , when she lives in a larger city and when she lives in a city with more skilled 
workers. The effects of city size and average schooling percolate through two different 
channels (partly nested into each other). First, a larger and/or more educated city implies 
stronger communication externalities, which in turn lead to more higher human capital and 
thus higher earnings. Second, a larger and/or more educated city also implies stronger 
                                                                 
12 We model the effects of the environment on workplace communication as a pure externality. More subtle (and 
realistic) mechanisms may be considered. In particular, workers may play a less passive role and decide how 
much time they want to communicate depending on where they are. With the data we have, unfortunately these 
issues are beyond the scope of this paper.  
13 Again, previewing some estimation issues, note that we still consider that cities only differ in their skill 
composition and their population size. Our specification also assumes that the unobserved social skills are iid 
across cities. These two assumptions are discussed further in Section 5. 
12 
externalities unrelated to communication like those caused by input sharing. They also lead to 
higher earnings. 
 Estimating directly (13), which is similar to what is estimated by Rauch (1993) and 
his followers, would not allow us to identify communication externalities. To identify such 
effects and distinguish them from the other external effects of human capital, our empirical 
strategy is to estimate (11) and (12) instead of estimating only the reduced form (13). To do 
this, data about workplace communication is obviously needed. 
 
 
4.  Data and Results 
 
4.1. Data 
 
In what follows, we exploit data from a detailed survey conducted in 1997 in France. 8812 
workers were randomly drawn from the labour force employed in manufacturing, services 
(accounting only) and retail (Do-It-Yourself chains only). Selected workers were individually 
interviewed and the information was matched with corresponding firm level data, other 
individual data, and location data. For each worker who responded to the survey and whose 
data could be matched with wage and location data, we know their responses to around 80 
questions covering a wide range of topics: working conditions, organisational change, 
workplace communication and informa tion technologies, workplace location (rural, 
suburban, or urban with the city population), earnings, and industry.  
 This data, further described in Appendix, is critically analysed in Greenan and 
Hamon-Cholet (2001a, b) and Greenan and Mairesse (1999) who offer various checks 
regarding its quality. A key part of the questionnaire regards around 20 questions related to 
the workplace communication of the surveyed workers. A first sub-set of questions is about 
communication within the firm. A second sub-set of questions regards communication 
external to the firm. Finally the last sub-set of questions is concerned with the media used by 
the surveyed workers. In this paper, we aggregate individual answers to all these questions 
into synthetic communication indices whose construction is explained in Appendix. 14 
 Before going any further in the analysis it is worth pausing to assess what can be 
learnt from our data. Our assessment is that such communication data despite obvious 
                                                                 
14 In a companion paper (Charlot and Duranton, 2003), we explore the details of the answers to these questions. 
13 
drawbacks contain valuable information about workplace communication. Note that the 
questions about whom the workers communicate with speak about “instructions”, which are 
defined as “important information given or received on a regular basis and are necessary for 
the conduct of your work”. Gossiping around the coffee machine does not constitute giving 
or receiving instructions. Instead meeting with a consultant with a view to solving a problem 
or asking a colleague how to operate a machine does. Hence part of the communication 
detected in the survey should reflect the circulation of knowledge that is crucial for the 
accumulation of human capital. We also expect the questions about the different media to 
reflect this.  
 However the survey is also severely limited by how far we can describe and 
characterise workplace communication. First, we know nothing about the destination of the 
communication. We know with whom workers communicate with but not where these other 
workers are: direct colleagues are very likely to be in the same location whereas customers 
and suppliers may not. Then, there is only one question about the intensity of communication. 
This is very limiting because this question is framed in a particular context (communication 
with customers using face-to-face or telephone). The last limitation regard the diversity of 
persons with whom communication takes place. This issue plays a crucial role in the model 
described above (and more generally in our thinking about the communication advantages of 
large cities). Unfortunately there is no question in the questionnaire to inform it.  
 
4.2. Econometric specification 
 
To estimate our earnings equation (11), we need to proxy workers’ skills by a set of 
observable characteristics. This implies the following econometric specification: 
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In equation (14), the (natural) log of the earnings of each worker is regressed on a set of 
personal characteristics together with a set of city characteristics corresponding to our 
theoretical specification. The variables Gender, Educ, Age and Age2 are standard proxies for 
individual skills in earnings equations. Education is measured by 6 dummies for educational 
14 
attainment.15 Age and its square proxy for labour market experience, which is unknown. 16 
Com is our main index of individual workplace communication. It ranges from 0 to 100. We 
also use a set of location characteristics. Because population is unknown for rural and 
(remote) suburban location, we introduce 3 dummy variables Urban, Suburb, and  Rural for 
workers located in urban, suburban and rural areas respectively. For urban areas, we proxy 
the city workforce, iN , by total city population, iPop  (which is interacted with the Urban 
dummy). The average skill level in an area is measured by the share of college and university 
graduates, our two highest educational attainments. Finally we construct an index of average 
city communication, meanCom, from our individual communication data. It also ranges from 
0 to 100. See the Appendix for more details on this index. 
 There are two main differences between (14) and the standard human capital 
framework. First we introduce workplace communication (Com) as another individual 
determinant of earnings. Second, to capture the external effects of aggregate labour supply 
highlighted in (11), equation (14) also estimates three coefficients 1c , 2c  and 3c  relating to 
population, the share of graduates, and aggregate communication in each location. 17  
 Turning to the communication equation (12), our econometric specification is: 
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In this equation, we proxy for individual skills, the city workforce and average schooling as 
in the earnings equation. The two specifications (14) and (15) have a number of potential 
pitfalls, which are discussed in the next section. Before discussing them, we first present our 
basic OLS results. 
 
                                                                 
15 Educ1 corresponds to university graduates (with at least three years of higher education), Educ2 denotes 
college graduates (two years of higher education), Educ3 is for high-school graduates, Educ4 is for graduates 
from vocational schools, Educ5 is for junior high-school graduates, and Educ6 (our reference) corresponds to 
the absence of degree. See the Appendix for more details . 
16 Since we know only the educational attainment and not the number of years of education, we cannot proxy 
labour market experience in the usual way (i.e., age - number years of education – 5). Note that this variable will 
capture not only the effects of experience but also cohort effects, etc. This need not worry us because the 
structural interpretation of the coefficient on this variable is not of fundamental importance here.  
17 Note that we do not use employment in the firm or establishment where the worker is employed as 
explanatory variable here (see instead, Charlot and Duranton, 2003). The main reason is that what this variable 
captures is rather unclear (worker unobserved ability or a real firm effect?). Furthermore, this variable is missing 
for many observations. 
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4.3. Earnings equation: OLS results 
 
Column 1 of Table 1 is our preferred specification for the earnings equation (14) since it is 
the one that matches most closely our theoretical specification (equation 11). The effects on 
earnings (or wages for that matter since we consider annualised earnings for full-time 
employees) of the standard individual variables (gender, education, age and its square) are in 
line with what is usually obtained in this type of exercise. There is no need to comment on 
them further. The first novel feature in this estimation regards the magnitude of the 
coefficient on individual communication. A one-point increase in the communication index 
on scale from 0 to 100 corresponds to a wage increase of 0.46%. More tellingly perhaps, a 
one-standard-deviation increase in the communication index (21.3 points) corresponds to a 
wage increase of about 10%. This effect is large and highly significant.  
 The effect of city size is in line with previous results in the literature (albeit in the 
lower tier of existing estimates): an increase of 1% in city size corresponds to a wage increase 
of 1.019%. This corresponds to scale economies of around 2%.18 The coefficient on mean 
city communication is only weakly significant and its magnitude is around one fourth of that 
on individual communication. Finally, the coefficient on the share of college and university 
graduates is large like in all previous estimates using this variable (Rauch 1993, Adserà 2000, 
Moretti, 2000 and 2002, etc). A one percentage point increase in the share of university and 
college graduates in a city of corresponds to a 0.5% increase in wages for all workers in this 
city. Stated differently, the measured external returns on college and university education are 
roughly of the same magnitude as the measured private returns.19 Note however that the 
correlation between the log of population and the share of graduates across urban areas is 
highly significant and quite high at 0.53. Hence the coefficient on the share of graduates may 
be capturing some of the effects of city size (and conversely).20  
 Columns 2-6 of Table 1 report results for similar estimations where one or more city 
level explanatory variables are left aside. They confirm the basic findings of Column 1 
                                                                 
18 The coefficient for the rural dummy is at 0.205 and the reference is a city of unit size. This implies that with a 
coefficient on log city population at 0.192, communication in rural areas is the same as in cities of around 
30,000.  
19 We do not know in which proportions innate abilities and educational inputs determine educational 
attainment. This issue is of secondary importance in our analysis because our model takes educational 
attainments as given and tries to estimate their external effects going through communication. However, any 
fully thought through policy attempting to make individuals internalise human capital externalities will require a 
precise answer to this question.  
20 This fact is usually ignored in the literature on human capital externalities where city size is typically 
measured in levels and not in logs if at all. 
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regarding the importance of individual communication, that of city size, that of the share of 
graduates and the mixed results for average communication. The very large coefficient on the 
share of graduates in Column 4 where city size is omitted confirms the strong collinearity 
between these two variables. Finally, Column 6 of Table 1 is a standard earnings equation 
with no city leve l variable and no individual communication. Note that individual 
communication has an important independent effect: the R2 goes up by five percentage points 
when individual communication is added to a standard earnings equation (see Columns 5 and 
6).  
 Table 2 reports the results of another series of earnings regressions, this time adding 
more controls. There are two reasons for doing this: robustness and comparison with the 
results of Rauch (1993) and his followers who use extensive sets of controls for individual 
and city characteristics. Adding further controls only marginally increases the explanatory 
power of the regressions. The R2 increases from 49% in our preferred specification to 51% 
when introducing family, sectoral and occupational controls. With respect to the four 
coefficients of interest (on individual communication, city population, mean communication 
and mean education), the changes are small. The effect of individual communication remains 
strong and very significant. Adding family, sectoral and occupational controls reduces the 
coefficient on individual communication by at most 15%. The coefficient on city population 
is reduced by around a fifth and it remains highly significant. Interestingly, these extra 
controls increase the coefficient on mean city communication and improve its significance. 
With all the extra controls, this coefficient is now significant at 5% whereas in Table 1 it is 
significant at 10% in only one specification. The coefficient on the share of graduates is 
mostly unchanged. Overall these results reinforce our previous findings.  
 In regressions not reported here, we also used city population instead of its log as is 
common in the literature. In this case, the coefficient on city size is very small but significant 
and the impact on the other coefficients (apart from the share of graduates) is minimal. We 
also ran our regressions using different classes of city size instead of log population with no 
sizeable change. To test the robustness of our communication index, we ran the regressions 
reported in Table 1 and 2 using two alternative communication indices.21 Again the 
differences were minimal. Finally, we re-estimated our regressions with robust standard 
errors as well as clustered standard errors. This is because we are using city aggregates as 
explanatory variables in a micro-data estimation. As highlighted above, this may create some 
                                                                 
21 Again see the Appendix for details. 
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heteroscedasticity. However, the estimated robust standard errors and clustered standard 
errors are close to those obtained by OLS - typically about 10% larger.  
 To conclude on the earnings equation, it is worth noting that despite the presence of 
communication variables, our results here are not very different from those obtained in the 
literature. Because he is also using the share of graduate to capture the external effects of 
human capital, we can compare directly our results with those of Moretti (2000) who uses US 
wage data and Moretti (2002) who is doing a similar exercise with production functions. We 
find that a one point increase in college graduates increases wages between 0.5% and 0.9% 
whereas Moretti (2000) obtains estimates ranging between 0.4% and 1.9% and Moretti 
(2002) is between 0.4% and 0.9% for output per worker. Because they are using different 
variables, a direct comparison with Rauch (1993), Adserà (2000), or Simon and Nardinelli 
(2002) is more difficult. Nonetheless, they also find external returns to education being 
between 30% and 100% of the private returns.   
 
4.4. Communication equation:  OLS results 
 
To explore the determinants of individual workplace communication, the latter is regressed 
on a set of individual characteristics and a set of city level variables.22 Note first that because 
the residuals in our two equations are a priori not correlated, it is legitimate to use another 
OLS.  
 Column 1 of Table 3 is our preferred specification for the communication equation 
(15) because it offers the closest match with our theoretical specification (equation 12). 
Looking first at the coefficients on the individual characteristics, we find evidence of a 
communication gender gap. The communication score of women is about 3.9 points below 
that of men. Given that the mean communication score is around 37, the relative 
communication gap between men and women is around 10%. This is less than the earnings 
gender gap, which is around 20%. In view of the results of Columns 4 and 5, this gender 
coefficient does not proxy for sectoral or occupational differences. Quite the contrary, the 
gender communication gap increases when these controls are introduced (see Columns 3 and 
4).  
 The coefficients on educational attainments show that education is a strong 
determinant of workplace communication. The difference between university and high-school 
                                                                 
22 We are not aware of any similar analysis in the literature. The only exception is Gaspar and Glaeser (1998) 
who regress a few city level communication variables on city characteristics.  
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graduates (i.e., Educ1 and Educ3) is 14 points whereas that between high-school graduates 
and dropouts with no degree is even larger at 24 points (i.e., more than one standard 
deviation). As shown by Columns 3 and 4, only a small part of this gap is accounted for by 
sectoral and occupational dummies. There is also evidence of a small age effect. An extra 
year of age at 20 increases communication by 0.6 point. At age 40, the increase is smaller: 
0.15 points. Communication peaks at around 50 years, slightly before earnings.  
 Turning to city level variables, we find first a significant but small effect of city 
population. Moving from a city with a population of 10,000 to one with 5 million 
corresponds to an increase in the individual communication score of 2.4 points. Regarding 
the share of college and university graduates, we again find a significant but small effect. 
Workers in a city with twice the national share of graduates (i.e., 30% instead of 15%) see 
their communication score increase by 2 points. Hence both city size and average urban 
schooling have a positive effect on communication. However these effect are small --- much 
smaller than the direct effects of city size and average schooling on wages. This is our main 
finding.  
 Column 2 of Table 3 reports results when mean city communication is added as 
explanatory variable. The coefficient on this variable is highly significant and the coefficient 
on city size becomes insignificant. This could be because workers communicate more in 
environments where there is more communication, a feature ignored by our theoretical 
specification. However, we must remain cautious here because the meanCom is constructed 
by aggregating individual observations. As a result, this variable is correlated with individual 
communication in small cities where the number of observations is low.  
 Adding sectoral dummies (Column 3) to the preferred estimation changes close to 
nothing. By contrast, adding occupational dummies (Column 4) makes the city level variables 
less significant or not significant at all. This was to be expected because managerial 
occupations in which workers communicate a lot are overwhelmingly located in large and 
highly educated cities. However, occupation and location could well be jointly determined 
making the interpretation of Column 4 problematic. Even when accepting the results in this 
column at face value, one would need to explain why high-communication positions tend to 
be disproportionately located in larger and more educated cities.  More generally, it is worth 
noting that a ‘full ceteris paribus’ is not desirable here. We expect communication intensive 
jobs to be unevenly distributed across industries, firms and occupations. Communication 
intensive jobs are also expected to be located in larger cities. Controlling for all the features 
that explain communication and determine location at the same time is not likely to be very 
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enlightening to the extent that these could be the two sides of the same coin. 23 Finally we also 
estimated these regressions with robust standard errors. As with the earnings regression, the 
differences in the standard errors with standard OLS estimates are small. 
 The main conclusions we draw from Table 3 are the following. The local environment 
matters to determine individual communication but the effects are small – much smaller than 
in the earnings equation. We also find that individual communication is fairly well explained 
by individual characteristics (gender, age, and education). However, the R2 are on average 
below those obtained in the earnings equations, hinting at the importance of unobserved 
social skills ( jm ).  
 What about the effects of communication externalities on earnings? Using the 
Columns 1 of Tables 1 and 3, a log point increase in city population increases individual 
communication by 0.385. This in turn implies an increase of 0017600045803850 ... =´  log 
point for the wage. This corresponds to a wage increase of about 0.18%. At the same time, 
the direct coefficient on city size in the earnings equation is about ten times as large at 1.9%. 
Turning to the share of university and college graduates, a percentage point increase in the 
local fraction of graduates increases communication by 0.131, which implies a wage effect of 
+0.06%. The direct coefficient of the share of graduates in the earnings equation is about 8 
times as large. When calculating their standard errors, both coefficients are significant at 5%. 
Hence communication externalities appear to take place in cities but they are small. About 
one tenth of the benefits of city size percolate through communication. 24 Turning to the 
external returns to education, again around 12% of them only seem to pass through 
communication. Stated differently, the external returns to education mediated by 
communication correspond to around 10% of the private returns. 
 
 
 
                                                                 
23 For instance assume the existence of ‘blue’ jobs subject to weak communication externalities and ‘white’ jobs 
subject to strong communication externalities. With communication fostered by city size and the cost of workers 
also increasing with city size, in equilibrium we expect white jobs to be located in large cities and blue jobs to 
be located in small cities. Controlling for the 'colour' of jobs would not be very helpful in this model. More 
generally, a more complete test of communication externalities would involve a theory of and data about the 
location of jobs. This is beyond the scope of this paper. In absence of an equation for the location of jobs, a full 
ceteris paribus is not desirable.   
24 There is also an indirect effect of these communication externalities. A greater share of graduates and/or a 
larger population increase the human capital of all workers through communication externalities. In turn a larger 
human capital has a positive effect on output through the other externalities. This indirect (or combined) effect 
is however very small because the effects of average communication are only about a quarter of those of 
individual communication.   
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5.  Estimation Issues and Robustness Tests 
 
Estimating equations (14) and (15) with simple OLS raises a series of estimation issues that 
need to be discussed. They regard the imperfect substitutability across workers with different 
skills, the spatial sorting of workers, the possible endogeneity of communication, city size, 
and education. Let us discuss them in turn.  
 
5.1. Imperfect substitutability across workers  
 
As highlighted by Ciccone and Peri (2002) and Moretti (2000 and 2003), the wage of 
unskilled workers can increase with the relative supply of skilled workers for reasons 
unrelated to human capital externalities. In fact, for average wages to increase with the 
relative supply of skilled workers, we only need skilled and unskilled workers to be imperfect 
substitutes in the local production function (instead of perfect substitutes as assumed in the 
model). Put differently, a positive coefficient on the share of graduates could reflect 
imperfect substitutability across workers rather than some external effects of human capital.  
 Such imperfect substitutability also implies that the wage of skilled workers should 
decrease with their relative supply. Like Moretti (2000), it is possible to re-run our basic 
regressions but using only observations relating to university educated workers. If the 
coefficient on the local share of university graduates is still positive, this implies that the 
positive effect of human capital externalities more than offsets the negative effect of the 
increase in their relative supply. 
 The results are reported in Table 4. They show that the coefficient on the share of 
university graduates, although not as large as before is still well above zero. It is also 
interesting to note that the other coefficients such as those on communication and city size 
are very close to those obtained with the full sample.    
 
5.2.  Spatial sorting 
 
The model above assumes that earnings differences between cities are explained only by 
exogenous differences in population and human capital. Furthermore, the disturbance terms 
in the earnings equation were assumed to be iid across cities, just like the social skills (i.e., 
the disturbance term in the communication equation). Instead, it could be that large cities 
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attract workers with high levels of human capital and social skills because of better amenities 
for instance. This alternative explanation based on sorting could easily explain the strong 
correlation between average human capital and earnings. This is a long-standing worry in the 
literature. As already noted by Alfred Marshall (1890 - p.199): “the large towns and 
especially London absorb the very best blood of all the rest of England; the most enterprising, 
the most highly gifted, those with the highest physique and strongest character go there to 
find scope for their abilities”. Of course what applies to London could certainly apply to 
Paris. 
 To make a first cut at this issue, note that our data contains some information about 
the birthplace of workers. This information is at the level of the 95 French ‘départements’ 
which cover the country. This is certainly not ideal but we should be able to detect spatial 
sorting (if any) through different outcomes for those who work where they were born (the 
‘stayers’) and the others (the ‘movers’). We started by running our preferred earnings and 
communication equations with a full set of dummies. We gradually got rid of those that were 
not significant to reach the specifications that appear in Table 5. Column 1 reports the 
earnings equation with the relevant dummies for the movers. Interestingly we find that the 
returns to communication for movers are higher even after controlling for age, gender, 
education and city characteristics. We also find that movers benefit more from being in larger 
cities and in cities with more communication. Column 2 reports results for the 
communication equation. It shows that the effect of city size on communication is weaker for 
movers than for stayers .  
 These findings support the idea that workers sort themselves across cities. Workers 
with better unobserved abilities or social skills tend to go to larger cities and are able to 
benefit more from them. At the same time, these workers are less sensitive to their 
environment with respect to their communication behaviour. Hence, for movers only 7% of 
the effects of city size appear to percolate through communication externalities instead of 
10% in the basic estimates. For stayers, about 25% of the effects of city size percolate 
through communication externalities.  
 An alternative approach is to treat worker location as a variable that is determined 
jointly with communication and wages. The argument behind this is that workers may decide 
whether to remain where they where born or to go to some other place with their choice being 
determined by the characteristics of the cities. This would then imply that city size and the 
share of graduates are determined simultaneously with wages and communication. The only 
possible instruments we have for the characteristics of the chosen location (share of graduates 
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and population) are the occupational status of both parents at birth and the place of birth. In 
the first column of Table 6, we instrument the size of the city of residence and its share of 
graduates with the occupational status of the parents and the population density of the 
birthplace in 1990.  Although not very conclusive, the results show that the coefficient on the 
share of graduates more than doubles whereas that on city population is divided by three and 
becomes insignificant. In the last column of Table 6, the same procedure is applied to the 
communication equation. The coefficient on city size nearly doubles whereas that on the 
share of graduates remains very close to its baseline in Table 3. Unfortunately both 
coefficients are insignificant. These disappointing results are caused by the weakness of our 
instruments. The R2 in the instrumental regressions are between 15 and 20%.25  
 In conclusion, we seem to have, on the one hand, good communicators who go to 
large cities and benefit strongly from them. These good communicators also have high 
returns to their own communication but they do not gain much from communication 
externalities. On the other hand, we have stayers with less favourable characteristics who are 
able to benefit relatively more from communication externalities. However, this evidence of 
spatial sorting does not modify greatly our previous conclusions.26 Communication 
externalities account for only a small share of the external effects of city size and average 
urban schooling. 
 
5.3. Endogeneity of communication 
 
Our communication variable has a lot of intuitive appeal but may be suspected of being 
simultaneously determined with the wage. Indeed, workers with higher (unobserved) abilities 
are likely to occupy positions implying both a higher wage and more communication. More 
generally, we may have ignored a crucial variable, which determines both earnings and 
communication. This estimation problem can again be investigated using instrumental 
variables. For good instruments, we need exogenous variables, which determine workplace 
communication, but remain un-correlated with the residual in our earnings equation.  
                                                                 
25 Note that this is not very surprising since idiosyncratic factors are known to play an important role in 
migration decisions. 
26 Even if sorting accounted for all our results, one would need to explain why ‘good communicators’ cluster in 
large cities where more communication takes place. If this is because they want to communicate more and these 
places offer opportunities (or a lower cost) to do so, the spirit of our results would not be modified. More serious 
would be the case of an omitted ability bias such that (i) it makes workers more efficient, (ii) it is correlated with 
large city location, and (iii) it leads workers to communicate more in a world where (iv) communication plays 
no productive role. However, it is unclear to us which plausible alternative model could satisfy these four 
conditions. 
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 In this respect, we can use the part of our data related to working conditions and 
changes in the work environment. Time spent daily in front of computer and having to do 
repetitive movements at work can be used as predictors for communication. Important recent 
changes in the work environment or in the organisation of work also predict the 
communication score of workers since such changes are typically correlated with a more 
important role for information technologies. These variables are not correlated with the 
residual in the earnings equation. 
 A Hausman specification test (Green, 2000) shows that indeed endogeneity is an issue 
here. However instrumenting communication by organisational change and working 
conditions does not change dramatically our results. Comparing the instrumental variables 
results reported in Table 6 Columns 2-4 with those of Table 1, it appears first that the 
coefficient on individual communication doubles. In Columns 2 and 3, The coefficient on 
city population is now slightly higher at 2.2% whereas that of the share of graduates 
decreases from 0.5 to 0.3. Overall, there is some simultaneity between communication and 
earnings. However, after instrumenting for communication, our results with respect to the 
importance of communication externalities remain roughly the same.  
 
5.4. Other issues 
 
Further to these considerations, one may assume that the provision of education is biased 
with high-wage cities offering more and better education. 27 This channel could explain a 
positive correlation between earnings and average human capital. In France however, primary 
and secondary education is managed by the central government. The French education 
system is also very concerned about equity within the country. Consequently, the curriculum 
is the same everywhere. The central government also aims to equalize class size, resources 
spent per pupil, etc. Hence strong biases at the level of primary or secondary education are 
unlikely. The case of higher education is subtler. Paris hosts most of the best universities and 
‘grandes écoles’.28 The recruitment of most grandes écoles is national in scope so that any 
effect here should be part of the spatial sorting bias already explored. Universities have a 
local catchment area at the bachelor level. Parisian universities have a national recruitment at 
                                                                 
27 These issues are only given a cursory treatment here. They are dealt with at length by Moretti (2000) who 
shows that they only play a minor role. In his careful instrumentation of the share of graduates in the US, 
Moretti (2000) found that accounting for endogeneity here did not modify his conclusions, nor would the use of 
the longitudinal dimension of his data. 
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the master and doctoral level. Hence, at the master and doctoral level, we are back again to 
spatial sorting. The unexplored bias regards university students in Paris, who during their first 
two or three years at university are able to study in more prestigious institutions like La 
Sorbonne. However, funding per student across universities is also equalised. Whether the 
more prestigious professors in Parisian universities are enough to create a large bias in the 
accumulation of human capital at the bachelor level is somewhat doubtful.  
 Finally, one may argue that city size is endogenous to wages. This again seems very 
unlikely. As shown by Eaton and Eckstein (1997), French cities have experienced parallel 
population growth over the last 200 years. Hence it is difficult to argue that causality runs 
from high wages to population growth. To corroborate this, Ciccone (2002) instruments the 
population of French départements in his analysis of agglomeration effects in Europe and 
finds only negligible endogeneity problems.  
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
This paper addresses the issue of the external returns to human capital in cities. We focus on 
one particular channel through which human capital externalities are often alleged to 
percolate: communication externalities at the workplace. To estimate such externalities, we 
use a unique French data set, which surveys workplace communication for around 6000 
workers in 1997. This allows us to estimate both a communication equation and an earnings 
equation using individual workplace communication as explanatory variable along with other 
personal and city characteristics.  
 We find that only around 10% of the effects of a larger and more educated city 
percolate through communication. Even acknowledging unobserved quality effects, it seems 
highly unlikely that communication externalities account for the bulk of the positive effects 
of larger and more educated cities on earnings. At the same time however, it is possible to 
interpret these findings in a more positive light and argue that communication externalities 
appear to be indeed present in cities.  
 These conclusions indicate three directions for future research. First, we are yet to 
explore the full richness of our data. These findings, based on an aggregate communication 
index, warrant further research into the details of the different media being used, the workers 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
28 France has a two-tier system for higher education. ‘Grandes écoles’ (engineering, business and literature) 
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involved, the type of communication taking place and how location matters with respect to 
these issues. Charlot and Duranton (2003) take some steps in this direction. The analysis of 
workplace communication could also be enriched by looking at firms rather than individual 
workers. Second, note that this paper makes some progress towards the identification of one 
channel through which human capital externalities are often argued to permeate. It also 
proposes a quantitative assessment of its importance taking into account the possible 
endogeneity of communication. We also took small steps to deal with the possible 
endogeneity of workers’ location. Future work should be doing more on this aspect. 
Furthermore, the issues surrounding the endogeneity of firm location should also be dealt 
with in future work. Third, channels other than communication should be explored in more 
details. In particular and with respect to city size and average urban schooling, the benefits of 
labour market pooling and input-output linkages should receive more attention. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
have competitive entrance examinations whereas there is no selection to enter university. 
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Appendix 1:  Data Description 
 
The enriched COI data 
 
The basic data is from the 1997 “Changement Organisationnel et Informatisation” (COI) 
survey. This data is composed of four different business surveys matched with one labour 
force survey. The first business survey (manufacturing) and the workforce survey for the 
associated workers were conducted by the French Ministry of Industry. The second (food 
industry) was conducted by the French Ministry of Agriculture while the last two surveys 
(DIY chains and accountants) were carried out by INSEE (French National Institute for 
Statistics and Economics Studies). The conception of the business survey in manufacturing, 
that of the labour survey, and the coordination of the 4 surveys were directed by Nathalie 
Greenan at the Centre d’Etudes de l’Emploi at the French Ministry of Labour. 
 This firm/employee matched survey is mostly concerned with organisational change 
and information technologies. This data was later on matched with the Déclaration Annuelle 
Des Salaires (DADS) and with Enquête Annuelle d’Entreprises (EAE) also from INSEE. The 
DADS data is collected for fiscal purpose. It is exhaustive on all French salaried workers and 
contains information about employment and earnings. Furthermore, for all workers born in 
October of even years (those selected for COI), it also contains a wealth of personal 
characteristics. The EAE survey is also exhaustive for all firms with more than 20 employees. 
It contains a wealth of firm level data. 
 Initially 4025 representative firms were selected from general manufacturing (2541), 
the Food industry (478), accounting firms (734), and DIY shops (272). Within each group 
(general manufacturing, food industry, accounting, DIY), firms were randomly drawn among 
those with 50 or more employees. This sectoral heterogeneity in the nature of the surveyed 
firms need not worry us because in most cases, the data is broken down by sector.  
 Interviewers went to interview directly 1, 2 or 3 randomly chosen employees in each 
selected firm. When it was impossible to meet face-to-face with an employee, the 
interviewers did the survey on the phone. A total of 8812 employees were initially drawn. In 
total, 6177 employee questionnaires were obtained from 3153 firms. The 30% of non-
respondents include employees who refused to respond (about 9%), those who could not be 
found by the interviewers (11 %) and those who had left their firm by the end of the year 
(9%) and could not subsequently be ma tched with the DADS data. Further details on the data 
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can be found in Greenan and Mairesse (1999) and Greenan and Hamon-Cholet (2001a,b). 
The match with firm level data obtained from the business survey led to a loss of another 594 
observations. 
 
Location data 
 
Using postcode data at the establishment level, this survey was matched to a set of spatial 
units. We lost another 101 observations in the process. Metropolitan France contains 361 
urban areas where employment is at least 5,000. The rest of the count ry is classified into 
different levels of ‘peri-urban’ (i.e., remote suburban) and rural areas. For simplicity, outside 
urban areas we only distinguish suburban from rural areas.  
 Note that the French definition of urban areas in this typology is rather broad and 
matches rather closely that of (consolidated) metropolitan areas in the US except that the 
threshold is much below (5,000 jobs instead of 100,000 inhabitants). To be consistent with 
the breadth of the definition of urban areas, the definition of suburban area is rather restrictive 
and narrow. A ‘suburban’ area in this typology is usually a rather remote ring around an 
urban area (a.k.a. exurban or peri-urban). Unfortunately, because a significant fraction of 
these remote suburban areas are functionally linked with two or more cities, they cannot be 
matched to particular adjacent urban areas. Urban areas contain about 60% of the French 
population and 70% of French employment. Around 65% of our observations are located in 
urban areas. This slight urban under-representation is due to the over-representation of the 
food industry whose location is often rural. Suburban areas account for around 10% of our 
observations. Finally, 25% of the observations are located in rural areas.  
 
The communication questions 
 
The employee questionnaire contains around 80 questions covering a wide range of topics 
about working conditions, organisational change and information technologies. Regarding 
communication, the most relevant questions are:  
 
30. Are you in contact (face-to-face or telephone) with customers? (All the time/Regularly/At 
times/ Never)  
  
31. Except for your subordinates (if any), do you give instructions to the following persons 
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about their work?  
a/ Colleagues with whom you are usually working: Yes/No/Not Applicable.  
b/ Others, working for the same firm: Y/N/NA.  
c/ Others, working for another firm (customer, supplier, etc.): Y/N/NA. 
  
32. Except for your superior(s), do you receive instructions from the following persons about 
your work?  
a/ Colleagues with whom you are usually working: Y/N/NA. 
b/ Others, working for the same firm: Y/N/NA.  
c/ Others, working for another firm (customer, supplier, etc.): Y/N/NA. 
 
34. How do you receive important instructions about your work?  
a/ Face-to-face communication: Y/N.  
b/ Telephone: Y/N.  
c/ Paper (including fax, telex, etc.): Y/N. 
d/ Computer (electronic mail, etc.): Y/N.  
 
40. Do you do some of your work in a team? Y/N.  
40b. If yes, are you involved with the following?  
a/ Colleagues from the same unit: Y/N.  
b/ Others, from the same firm: Y/N .  
c/ Others, external from your firm: Y/N .  
40c. If yes, what type of work is concerned? Conception (or design, or research) / 
Production  
 
52. Do you use ever a PC or a workstation at work? Y/N. 
 
55. Do you use information technologies to search for information? Y/N.  
 
68. Do you use internet at work? Y/N. 
 
69. Do you use an intranet at work? Y/N. 
 
Note that these questions refer to different aspects of workplace communication. Question 30 
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regards the intensity of external communication with customers. Unfortunately this is the 
only question in this direction. Questions 31, 32, 40a and b refer to whom the worker 
communicate with. Note also that questions 31 and 32 relate to ‘instructions’ received or 
given by the worker. The questionnaire defines instructions as “important information 
received or given by the worker on a regular basis to conduct his or her work”. Question 40c 
is of particular interest because it relates to creative activities upon which the literature puts 
special emphasis. The remaining questions refer to the media used by the worker for his or 
her workplace communication. The main weakness of this data is that we know where the 
surveyed workers are located but we do not know where the workers they communicate with 
are.  
 
Our communication indices 
 
The answers to all binary questions were coded 1 for yes and 0 for no. Answers to questions 
30 were coded 4 for the highest level of communication, 3, 2, and 1 for the lowest. We then 
aggregated this into a varie ty of communication indices. Our main index, Com, is a weighted 
average. We gave an equal weight to the following five dimensions: 
- Communication internal to the firm (sum of 31a, 31b, 32a, 32b, 40b a, and 40b-b). 
- Communication external to the firm (sum of 31c, 32c, and 40b-c). 
- Intensity of communication (30). 
- Media (sum of 34a, b, c, d, e, 52, 55, 68, and 69). 
- Involvement in creative activities with others (40c). 
 This index is normalised to be between 0 and 100. The mean score for our sample is 37.1 
and the standard error is 21.3. We also constructed two alternative indices: Com_b and 
Com_c. Com_b is simply the sum of the score to all questions normalised to take a maximum 
of 100. Com_c is a slightly more complex index where external communication together with 
involvement in creative activities is given the same weight as internal communication. The 
sum of the two is then multiplied by the intensity of communication as measured by question 
30. This product counts for 75%. The remaining 25% are given by the sum to the media 
questions. Again this index is normalised to take a maximum of 100.  
 We prefer Com because it gives more weights to the intensity of communication with 
persons external to the firm and the involvement in creative activities, which we view as 
potentially important channels for communication externalities. It is also consistent with the 
results of the principle component analysis that we conduct in Charlot and Duranton (2003). 
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This analysis shows that the variables relating to external communication, the intensity of 
communication, and the use of IT and telecommunication have a strong spatial pattern. They 
enter heavily in the main axis which accounts for about a quarter of the variability. Two other 
axes account for about a tenth of the variability. They are about more routine forms of 
communication (e.g., face-to-face and internal communication) and team-work participation 
respectively. Our index reflects these features.  
 Concerning the possible alternatives to Com, Com_b is much simpler but internal 
communication may be over-represented because of the wealth of questions on this issue. 
Com_c is possibly more realistic since communication is weighted by its intensity but it relies 
to a large extent on the answer to only one question (30). The pair-wise correlation between 
these indices across workers is between 0.93 and 0.96. We replicated all our regressions 
using Com with Com_b and Com_c. Unsurprisingly the results were never very different. 
 
Our average communication index 
 
The variable measuring average communication is the weighted mean city communication 
imeanCom . It is constructed from our individual data in the following way. We summed 
across educational attainments (denoted g), the product of the 1999-census share of shares of 
workers ( ( )gsi ) by their empirical mean level of communication ( ( )gComi ): 
 
( ) ( )å
=
=
6
1g
iii gComgsmeanCom ,        (A1) 
 
The problem is that in small cities, we have no observation for some educational attainments. 
To fill the blanks and using all the observations we have for the city, we computed the 
following communication ratio: 
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ê
ë
é
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i
i
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n
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where ( )gni  is the number of workers in the sample with educational attainment g in city i, 
in  is the sampled population in city i, and ( )gCom  is the national mean of workers of 
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educational attainment j. We then proxied ( )gComi  by ( )gComqi .  
 
Because we use the real proportion for each educational attainment, this index avoids sample 
selection biases for the composition of educational attainment for small urban areas for which 
we have no more than a handful of observations. 
 
Working condition variables 
 
To instrument for the possible endogeneity of workplace communication, we use data 
regarding working conditions: 
- Computer use: number of hours spent daily in front of a computer. 
(The information is coming from Question 79: On average how many hours do you spend 
in front of your computer if at all? Hours per week on average.) 
- Repetitive movements: whether the position occupied by the worker involves the 
repetition of the same movement(s).  
(Question 43. Does your work involve the continuous repetition of the same series of 
movements and/or operations? Y/N)  
- Organisational change: whether the working environment and the organisation of work 
has changed significantly in the last three years. 
(Questions 8 and 8b. Has your working environment changed dramatically in the last 
three years? Y/N. If yes, is it because of a change of position? Y/N. A change of 
technique? Y/N. Restructuring of the firm? Y/N. A change in the organisation of your 
work? Y/N. Other?) 
 
Other variables 
 
The COI data contains 14 possible levels of educationa l attainment. Given the small 
population in some cells and the lack of discernible wage differences between some cells, we 
aggregated these 14 categories into the six, which are used by the French census. 
 
Educ1: university graduates (a degree involving at least three years of higher education). 
Educ2: college graduates (two years of higher education). 
Educ3: high-school graduates. 
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Educ4: vocational school graduates. 
Educ5: junior high-school graduates. 
Educ6 (our reference): no degree (early school drop-out). 
 
The variable shareGraduates was constructed from the 1999 census. It reports the share of 
the population in each area with our two highest levels of educational attainments (Educ1 or 
Educ2). 
 
To distinguish retail (DIY) and accounting firms from manufacturing, we created two dummy 
variables: 
Accounting for workers employed in accounting firms. 
Retail for workers employed in DIY firms. 
Workers in manufacturing are used as the reference. 
 
The Wage variable refers to the net annualised earnings received by the employee. It comes 
from the DADS data. This data is collected from all employers (and self-employed) in France 
for pension, benefits and tax purposes. A report must be filled by every establishment for 
each of its employees so that there is a unique record for each employee-establishment-year 
combination. The mandatory aspect of this data is a guarantee of its quality. 
 The occupational dummy Non-routine was created from the detailed information in 
the COI data about the occupation. We classified as ‘non-routine’ all jobs that a priori 
involve some autonomy for the employee. All other occupations were classified as ‘routine’. 
Among non-routine jobs, we have functions such as: sales, management, accounting, 
research, teaching, etc whereas we classified as routines functions like cleaning, production, 
domestic work, handling of goods, etc. This distinction attempts to generalise the usual white 
collar / blue collar opposition in manufacturing. We tried more detailed breakdowns for the 
occupations. This only led to minor changes in our results.  
 We exploited the information about the place of birth (at the level of the 95 French 
départements --- these units are comparable to counties in the US or the UK) and the place of 
work. If someone works in the département he or she was born, this person is classified as a 
stayer. Otherwise, this person is a mover. In our sample, we have 43% of movers and 57% of 
stayers. We also used data from the 1990 census to compute population density in the place 
of birth in 1990. 
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the COI data. Occupations are classified according to the one-digit French classification of 
occupations, which contains eight entries (inactive/student, unskilled blue-collar, skilled blue-
collar, white-collar employee, self-employed, intermediate profession, professional, 
apprentice). 
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Appendix 2:  Results 
 
Table 1:  Earnings equations  
 
logW 
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 1.618 1.600 1.670 1.767 1.936 1.911 
 (0.0956) (0.0957) (0.0892) (0.0903) (0.0826) (0.0856) 
Gender -0.209 -0.207 -0.209 -0.210 -0.1978 -0.217 
 (0.00932) (0.00932) (0.00932) (0.00932) (0.00934) (0.00962) 
Educ1 0.573 0.578 0.570 0.576 0.624 0.827 
 (0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0217) (0.0218) (0.0212) (0.0193) 
Educ2 0.332 0.331 0.329 0.336 0.351 0.513 
 (0.0197) (0.0198) (0.0197) (0.0198) (0.0197) (0.0186) 
Educ3 0.211 0.210 0.209 0.214 0.221 0.346 
 (0.0188) (0.0189) (0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0189) (0.0185) 
Educ4 0.109 0.107 0.107 0.109 0.109 0.176 
 (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0146) (0.0147) 
Educ5 0.0217 ns 0.0194 ns 0.0204 ns 0.0223 ns 0.0175 ns 0.0434 
 (0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0187) (0.0194) 
Age 0.0705 0.0702 0.0704 0.0706 0.0701 0.0759 
 (0.00406) (0.00407) (0.00406) (0.00407) (0.00408) (0.00422) 
Age² -0.000616 -0.000612 -0.000614 -0.000616 -0.000600 -0.000660 
 (0.0000491) (0.0000492) (0.0000491) (0.0000492) (0.0000492) (0.0000560) 
Com 0.00458 0.00466 0.00467 0.00461 0.00507  
 (0.000261) (0.000261) (0.000254) (0.000261) (0.000253)  
Rural 0.205 0.305 0.208    
 (0.0402) (0.0338) (0.0401)    
Suburb 0.224 0.345 0.227    
 (0.0443) (0.0355) (0.0442)    
logPop 0.0192 0.0297 0.0195    
 (0.00349) (0.00263) (0.00348)    
meanCom 0.00116 c 0.000581 ns  0.00142 b   
 (0.000771) (0.000762)  (0.000771)   
shareGraduates 0.490  0.463 0.891   
 (0.107)  (0.105) (0.0740)   
Adj. R² 0.489 0.487 0.489 0.486 0.483 0.446 
N. obs 5329 5329 5329 5329 5329 5329 
 
 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. All coefficient significant at the 1% level except a significantly different 
from zero at the 5% level, b significantly different from zero at the 10% level and c significantly different from zero at the 
15% level, ns not significant.  
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Table 2:  Augmented earnings equations  
    logW  
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 1.750 1.776 1.726 1.747 
 (0.119) (0.0984) (0.0990) (0.0993) 
Gender -0.274 c -0.225 -0.229 -0.197 
 (0.172) (0.00997) (0.00992) (0.00972) 
Educ1 0.502 0.505 0.541 0.559 
 (0.0222) (0.0222) (0.0223) (0.0219) 
Educ2 0.259 0.262 0.301 0.320 
 (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0204) (0.0198) 
Educ3 0.163 0.165 0.183 0.212 
 (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0194) (0.0188) 
Educ4 0.0887 0.0890 0.0972 0.111 
 (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0146) (0.0143) 
Educ5 0.0202  ns 0.0194  ns 0.0251  ns 0.0210  ns 
 (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0184) (0.0183) 
Age 0.0614 0.0615 0.0656 0.0624 
 (0.00547) (0.00431) (0.00437) (0.00435) 
Age² -0.000508 -0.000524 -0.000563 -0.000525 
 (0.0000652) (0.0000519) (0.0000526) (0.0000524) 
Children 0.0170 0.0129 a 0.0128 0.0116 
 (0.00486) (0.00408)  (0.00415) (0.00412) 
Gender X Age 0.000775 ns    
 (0.00889)    
Gender X Age² -0.0000141  ns    
 (0.000108)    
Gender X Children -0.0194  a    
 (0.00895)    
Non-routine occup. 0.135 0.138 0.0794  
 (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0123)  
Accounting 0.0959 0.0952  0.0470 
 (0.0140) (0.0139)  (0.0133) 
Retail -0.160 -0.160  -0.156 
 (0.0217) (0.0217)  (0.0219) 
Com 0.00392 0.00392 0.00386 0.00502 
 (0.000279) (0.000279) (0.000284) (0.000262) 
Rural 0.145 0.150 0.206 0.164 
 (0.0396) (0.0396) (0.0400) (0.0400) 
Suburb 0.165 0.168 0.223 0.184 
 (0.0436) (0.0437) (0.0441) (0.0441) 
logPop 0.0149 0.0153 0.0187 0.0168 
 (0.00342) (0.00342) (0.00347) (0.00346) 
meanCom 0.00161 a 0.00162 a 0.00123 b 0.00147 b 
 (0.000754) (0.000755) (0.000767) (0.000763) 
shareGraduates 0.496 0.480 0.468 0.514 
 (0.104) (0.104) (0.106) (0.105) 
Adj. R² 0.512 0.510 0.493 0.500 
N. obs 5329 5329 5329 5329 
 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. All coefficient significant at the 1% level except a significantly different 
from zero at the 5% level, b significantly different from zero at the 10% level and c significantly different from zero at the 
15% level, ns non significant.  
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Table 3:  Communication equations  
 
Com     
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -8.814 b -39.611 -8.677 b -3.453 ns 
 (4.819) (4.990) (4.741) (4.396) 
Gender -3.998 -3.855 -5.129 -8.118 
 (0.501) (0.487) (0.510) (0.483) 
Educ1 37.834 37.480 36.934 24.363 
 (1.052) (1.022) (1.025) (1.037) 
Educ2 30.781 30.780 30.143 18.100 
 (0.975) (0.947) (0.963) (0.978) 
Educ3 23.819 23.652 22.433 12.968 
 (0.962) (0.935) (0.956) (0.940) 
Educ4 12.828 13.002 12.310 7.575 
 (0.760) (0.738) (0.748) (0.711) 
Educ5 4.933 5.437 5.330 4.178 
 (0.997) (0.969) (0.977) (0.906) 
Age 1.114 1.133 1.258 1.019 
 (0.219) (0.213) (0.214) (0.198) 
Age² -0.0120 -0.0120 -0.0131 -0.012 
 (0.00265) (0.00257) (0.00258) (0.00239) 
Non-routine occup.    18.115 
    (0.603) 
Accounting   -6.053 0.982 ns 
   (0.696) (0.686) 
Retail   4.790 3.397 
   (1.173) (1.088) 
Rural 1.393 ns -0.314 ns 4.261 a 1.776 ns 
 (2.170) (2.110) (2.037) (1.889) 
Suburb 3.578 c 1.156 ns 6.297 3.381 c 
 (2.391) (2.327) (2.244) (2.081) 
logPop 0.385 a 0.178 ns 0.528 0.253 c 
 (0.188) (0.183) (0.173) (0.161) 
meanCom  0.701   
  (0.0393)   
shareGraduates 13.092 a 28.238 11.458 a 5.232 ns 
 (5.687) (5.590) (5.410) (5.016) 
Adj. R² 0.318 0.357 0.345 0.438 
N. obs 5329 5329 5482 5482 
 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. All coefficient significant at the 1% level except a significantly different 
from zero at the 5% level, b significantly different from zero at the 10% level and c significantly different from zero at the 
15% level, ns non significant.  
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Table 4:  Earnings equations for university educated workers only 
 
logW   
Regressors (1) (2) 
Intercept 1.343 1.268 
 (0.191) (0.200) 
Gender -0.190 -0.209 
 (0.0213) (0.0222) 
Educ1 0.229  
 (0.0209)  
Age 0.0953 0.0967 
 (0.00914) (0.00957) 
Age² -0.000788 -0.000786 
 (0.000113) (0.000118) 
Com 0.00411 0.00519 
 (0.000523) (0.000538) 
Rural 0.276 0.308 
 (0.0776) (0.0811) 
Suburb 0.245 0.272 
 (0.0852) (0.0891) 
logPop 0.0236 0.0273 
 (0.00595) (0.00622) 
shareGraduates 0.350 b 0.413 a 
 (0.196) (0.205) 
Adj. R² 0.576 0.538 
N. obs 1256 1256 
 
 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. All coefficient significant at the 1% level except a significantly different 
from zero at the 5% level, b significantly different from zero at the 10% level and c significantly different from zero at the 
15% level, ns not significant. 
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Table 5:  Earnings and communication equations with controls for movers and stayers  
 
logW  Com  
Regressors (1) Regressors (2) 
Intercept 1.822 Intercept -7.520c 
 (0.109)  (4.808) 
Mover -0.345 Stayer -2.708 
 (0.100)  (0.831) 
Gender -0.209 Gender -3.943 
 (0.00930)  (0.494) 
Educ1 0.560 Educ1 37.886 
 (0.0219)  (1.018) 
Educ2 0.329 Educ2 30.696 
 (0.0197)  (0.964) 
Educ3 0.209 Educ3 23.713 
 (0.0188)  (0.955) 
Educ4 0.108 Educ4 12.988 
 (0.0144)  (0.757) 
Educ5 0.0209  ns Educ5 5.323 
 (0.0185)  (0.992) 
Age 0.0703 Age 1.113 
 (0.00406)  (0.216) 
Age² -0.000615 Age² -0.0117 
 (0.0000490)  (0.00261) 
Com 0.00392   
 (0.000333)   
Mover X Com 0.00138   
 (0.000442)   
Rural 0.0677  ns Rural 2.103 ns 
 (0.0602)  (2.140) 
Suburb 0.0998  c Suburb 4.078  b 
 (0.0635)  (2.329) 
Mover X Rural 0.206   
 (0.0741)   
Mover X Suburb 0.171  a   
 (0.0771)   
logPop 0.00822 c logPop 0.325  b 
 (0.00520)  (0.177) 
Mover X logPop 0.0151 Stayer X logPop 0.197  a 
 (0.00586)  (0.0825) 
shareGraduates 0.449 shareGraduates 11.946 a 
 (0.107)  (5.536) 
meanCom 0.0000630  ns   
 (0.000968)   
Mover X meanCom 0.00307   
 (0.00156)   
Adj. R² 0.492 Adj. R² 0.326 
N. obs 5329 N. obs 5482 
 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. All coefficient significant at the 1% level except a significantly different 
from zero at the 5% level, b significantly different from zero at the 10% level and c significantly different from zero at the 
15% level, ns not significant.  
39 
Table 6:  IV estimations  
 
 logW logW logW logW Com 
Regressors (IV1) (IV2) (IV3) (IV4) (IV5) 
Intercept 1.790 1.673 1.674 1.833 -4.583 ns 
 (0.128) (0.0965) (0.0966) (0.125) (7.162) 
Gender -0.222 -0.190 -0.190 -0.199 -4.566 
 (0.0106) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0118) (0.578) 
Educ1 0.548 0.388 0.386 0.382 33.212 
 (0.0262) (0.0334) (0.0333) (0.0335) (1.517) 
Educ2 0.307 0.176 0.174 0.173 26.630 
 (0.0243) (0.0286) (0.0285) (0.0285) (1.415) 
Educ3 0.185 0.0879 0.0869 0.0825 20.232 
 (0.0256) (0.0254) (0.0253) (0.0263) (1.493) 
Educ4 0.0886 0.0378 a 0.0371 a 0.0349 b 10.526 
 (0.0174) (0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0182) (0.989) 
Educ5 0.0224 ns -0.000351 ns -0.000585 ns 0.00317 ns 3.796 
 (0.0209) (0.0210) (0.0210) (0.0213) (1.170) 
Age 0.0696 0.0643 0.0642 0.0645 0.991 
 (0.00473) (0.00456) (0.00446) (0.00472) (0.266) 
Age² -0.000604 -0.000546 -0.000545 -0.00055 -0.0103 
 (0.0000571) (0.0000543) (0.0000547) (0.0000572) (0.00318) 
Com 0.00402 0.00977 0.00982 0.00899  
 (0.000303) (0.000696) (0.000692) (0.000878)  
Rural -0.0505 0.238 0.238 -0.0528 -3.725 
 (0.0114) (0.0417) (0.0417) (0.0117) (0.636) 
Suburb -0.0141 ns 0.277 0.277 -0.00693 ns -1.664 b 
 (0.0160) (0.0458) (0.0458) (0.0164) (0.893) 
logPop 0.00630 ns 0.0220 0.0220 0.00219 ns 0.797 ns 
 (0.0105) (0.00358) (0.00358) (0.0102) (0.580) 
shareGraduates 1.350 b 0.322 0.322 1.241 b 14.946 ns 
 (0.800) (0.112) (0.112) (0.741) (44.761) 
Adj. R² 0.495 0.486 0.486 0.480 0.299 
N. obs 4888 4888 4888 4888 4888 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. All coefficients significant at the 1% level except a significantly different from zero at the 
5% level, b significantly different from zero at the 10% level and c significantly different from zero at the 15% level, ns not significant. There 
are fewer observations than in previous tables because the density of the birthplace is not available for workers born abroad.  
In Column 1, log city population (logPop) and the share of university graduates (shareGraduates) are instrumented by the one digit 
occupational category of the father at birth, the same variable for the mother and the log of density in 1990 for the place of birth (at the level 
95 French departments). (The R² of the first instrumental regression – logPop – is rather low at 14%. That of the second instrumental 
regression – shareGraduates – is also low at 19%.) 
In Column 2, communication is instrumented by Computer use (see Appendix 1) and Repetitive movements. These variables are significant 
at 1% in the instrumental regression and are not correlated with the error term of the augmented regression.  
In Column 3, communication is instrumented by the same variables plus Organisational change . The R² of the instrumental regression is at 
41%.  
In Column 4, we instrument communication, log population and the share of graduates by the instruments above. 
In Column 5, we do as in column 1 using communication instead of wages as dependent variable.  
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